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Cost Benefit Analysis to assess urban mobility plans. 
Consumers’ surplus calculation and integration with 
transport models. 
 Paolo Beria, Raffaele Grimaldi  




Transport mobility plans, especially at the urban scale, are commonly produced by administrations. However, the 
decisions involved are often taken on a qualitative basis or, at best, by setting some indicators and verifying how much a 
plan or a scenario reaches the politically decided targets (e.g. “increasing by 10% the use of bike”). However, given that 
decisions on plans involve relevant public investments and may also determine radical changes in users’ costs, a more 
quantitative and comprehensive approach to the evaluation is needed. 
Cost Benefit Analysis is the tool commonly used to assess public expenditure, but its application to mobility plans 
introduces further practical and theoretical complexity.  
The aim of the paper is to discuss how CBA can be used to assess complex and multi-modal mobility plans (involving 
for example both infrastructural investments and lighter sustainable mobility policies). Firstly we will discuss which are 
the complexities involved by plan assessments vs. infrastructure assessments. Secondly, we will revise the available 
approaches, namely the Generalised Costs comparison approach, the Rule of Half and the logsum functions for the perfect 
integration between CBA and transport models. Thirdly, we will comment the main advantages and problems of the last 
approach, namely, the logsum, clarifying why it is the most suitable for the assessment of plans made of a broad range of 
policies and actions. Finally, we will outline an ongoing application for the assessment of the SUMP (Sustainable Urban 





 Why traditional CBA evaluations may fail in evaluating complex transport plans 
 At least three ways to approach the calculus of surplus exist: the generalised costs comparison 
method, the Rule of Half, the use of logsum function. 
 Logsum is the only method, which, together with a calibrated transport model, gives totally 
exhaustive and coherent results. However, it also presents some limits (transparency). 
 What a CBA of a mobility plan must include and how to do it integrating transport models 
with CBA assessment. 
 
 
JEL classification: D61, R42, R48 




1. Introduction: evaluating transport plans 
The economic evaluation of transport investments is usually intended as the assessment of transport 
infrastructure. However, infrastructure investments are only one way to approach transport problems 
and needs, and the possible actions a public planner can implement now include, more and more, 
other kinds of softer policies. The construction of a modern transport plan should then foresee single 
investments, but also improvements of existing transport services and implementation of sustainable 
mobility policies, such as city walkability, development of bike transport, road pricing, park pricing, 
technological investments on networks, vehicles and communications, smart mobility, vehicle 
sharing projects, incentives, redefinition of fares structure, mobility credits, etc. (EC, 2013; Eltis, 
2013; Banister, 2008) 
In this articulated context, the evaluation tools commonly used to support the design of mobility plans 
and the consequent public decisions are: 
 Traditional Cost Benefit Analysis, practically everywhere required to allocate public money 
for infrastructure investments, i.e. in cases where the public decision is dominated by the 
alternative allocation of lump sums; 
 Multicriteria analyses or Indicators-based assessments, used to “visualise” and clarify the 
goals and the (possibly positive) effects of the actions of a plan, such as the foreseen decrease 
in car ownership or pollutants concentrations. 
However, in the assessment of a plan made of both “hard” (infrastructural) investments and “soft” 
policies whose effects are not concentrated in time, both traditional approaches may fail. In particular, 
a rigid CBA may be not be able to catch all the effects of a plan and, in addition, provides too synthetic 
outputs to support the dialogue with public opinion and stakeholders. On the other side, indicators 
and MCA are, by definition, not able to measure the efficiency of public expenditure, which 
represents a key element of public decisions. For example, MCA cannot discriminate between a new 
metro line (which costs a lot to be built and gives localised transport cost advantages in the future) 
and, say, the setting of incentives to the change of old cars with low emission ones (which cost less 
but gives spread positive effects only in the field of external costs reduction).  
In addition, one must consider that the “typical” scheme of lump sum public costs versus distributed 
private benefits is not always the case, especially with pricing or limitation policies. In these cases, 
the effect is to give both advantages to some groups and disadvantages to others. Some policies are 
not, in fact, simply additive and this must be taken into account in the evaluation (Beria et al., 2012). 
For example, the closure of a city centre to private cars benefits the inhabitants because reduces 
pollution and improves the urban environment (positive effects that can be measured with appropriate 
indicators). At the same time, however, it generates also costs to other citizens which are now forced 
to switch from the private car (which was their best option before, maybe also because not paying for 
its external costs) to walking or to public transport (which costs more to them, for example in terms 
of travel time and flexibility). Then, a decision on this kind of policy should obviously take into 
account not only the benefits, but also the public and the private costs necessary to obtain them. 
 
When the existence of complex cost and benefit structures in the assessment of plans is recognised, 
practical problems rise. As already mentioned, approaches using indicators and MCA are not 
satisfactory to evaluate the trade-offs of public expenditure. At the same time, the CBA in the 
“simple” form suggested by numerous guidelines is not sufficiently complex to handle the previously 
mentioned problem and, in addition, fails in representing effectively the distribution of effects, 
especially for non win-win policies.  
For such reason, in the paper we will discuss how a Cost Benefit Analysis of a mobility plan could 
be implemented, focusing initially on the key theoretical and practical issue to be solved: the 
calculation of consumers’ surplus. As we will show, while the other costs and benefits can be 
3 
represented as usual and in an intuitive way (investment costs, running costs, environmental benefits, 
taxation, etc.; see for example DG Regio, 2008), the consumers’ surplus requires to be calculated 
with a transport simulation model and using the logsum  method, to avoid significant computational 
and theoretical errors. Secondly, we will discuss the further benefits of the integration between the 
transport model and the assessment, in terms of disaggregation and representation of results. For 
example, in this way benefits can be represented geographically and not only in an aggregate way. 
This kind of representation may be a useful complement to the aggregate CBA indicators (NPV, 
NBIR, B/C, IRR; DG Regio, 2008) in the due consultation phase and ultimately to take better 
decisions. Aside to the strengths of the logsum method, we will comment its drawbacks, which mainly 
belong to the issue of transparency of the calculations. 
The paper is structured as follows. The following Section 2 discusses three ways to calculate 
consumers’ surplus: the Generalised Cost comparison approach, the Rule of Half, the Logsum 
function. The literature on them is theoretically mature, but does not appear conclusive from the point 
of view of practical applications, where some ambiguities still exist. Section 3 goes more in deep with 
the less used approach: the logsum function method. We will comment when it is recommended, as 
other methods fail, but also its main limits. Section 4 discusses how the logsum can be practically 
calculated by means of a transport simulation model, when articulated plans are assessed. Section 5 
presents an advanced application of CBA for the assessment of a complex plan, namely the Milan 
Sustainable Mobility Plan. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Calculating the consumers’ surplus 
Theory and guidelines indicate three approaches to calculate the consumers’ surplus. However, the 
range of application of one method or another is seldom discussed, leaving the analyst the 
responsibility of choosing. Nevertheless, as we will show in the present section, the three methods 
are not perfect substitute. In particular, the simplest approach, the Generalised Cost comparison, 
results to be adequate only under very specific conditions, very seldom present. The other two 
methods are more general, but give different levels of precision and robustness and require different 
amounts of data to be applied. 
2.1 A dangerous method: the Generalised Costs comparison approach 
We define the consumers’ surplus as the difference between the willingness to pay of each user to 
make that trip and the “price” he has to “pay” to make it (Stiglitz, 2000). In transport, the “price” a 
user has to pay to make a trip is expressed by the so-called Generalised Cost (GC), that is the 
monetary effort that the user associates to his overall trip experience, including out-of-pocket 
expenses (tolls and fares), operating costs of the vehicles (in private transport) and consumed time. 
Other factors like discomfort, crowding, beauty of the landscape and more personal attitudes can also 
reduce or increase the GC of the same trip for different users.1 
We can calculate the variation in consumers’ surplus by multiplying the average unit reduction in 
GCs (from initial situation 1 to the final situation 2, after the investment) by the number Q of users 
(Equation 1). 
 
S = Q·(GC1 – GC2) Equation 1
                                                 
1 In the paper we refer to the calculation of users’ surplus in terms of perceived (or private) costs, which – as we discussed 
in a former paper (Grimaldi & Beria, 2013) – requires some corrections to balance transfers (e.g., taxes and fares) among 
different parts of the society. Another relatively widespread approach, especially when the GCs comparison is used, is to 





However, this can be done consistently only under very strict conditions, typical of simple problems 
only: single mode appraisals and rigid demand, that is when we expect no induced users from other 
modes or paths. 
In less simple cases or in any multimodal appraisal, instead, we expect a certain amount of users to 
shift from other modes (or paths, time of the day, etc.) to the one influenced by the new project. In 
this case, we cannot calculate the surplus variation of the shifting users as the sum of the reduction in 
the weighted sum of time, costs, discomfort and so on - that is in their GCs – because it is practically 
impossible to know GCs for every user and non-user before and after the scheme is implemented. 
This ignorance makes it impossible to calculate the effect for the users whom change mode or path 
in consequence of the scheme. 
More realistically, when available, we can use a transport model to obtain the average generalised 
costs of groups of users (see section 4.2), also in a very detailed way. Apparently, we could calculate 
the benefit of the scheme referring to the average GCs of the groups, if a model simulates for us the 
GCs of all groups. However, also this approach introduces errors in the estimation of the benefits, 
because shifting users are exactly those having the highest distance from the average value of their 
group. In other words, the difference between average values of GCs of groups of users is (too) 
different from the benefit of individuals.  
Let us consider an example of a group of users Q, having the same characteristics (origin-destination, 
travel purpose, etc.). When a new project is implemented, it reduces the average GC of a sub-group 
of Qa users initially using the mode a from GC1,a to GC2,a (say from 106 to 98, that is a reduction of 
8). These users do not use the alternative mode b because it is more costly for them (say higher than 
106). The benefit of the project for those users is simply given by the unit benefit of GC1,a - GC2,a 
(say 8) multiplied by the amount Qa of the users themselves (Table 1).  
 
Qa existing users Before  After    
 GC1,a GC1,b GC2,a CG2,b Benefit 
Average values 106 >106 98 >106  
Total benefit     Qa·(GC1,a - GC2,a) 
= Qa·8 (106-98) 
Table 1. Calculation of the benefits for existing users on the mode ‘a’. 
A second sub-group of users Qb was using mode b before the project was implemented, because for 
them mode b had a lower average GC with respect to a. A transport model suggests, for example, that 
a part of the users of the group will shift to the mode a after the scheme is implemented thanks to the 
reduction of GCa. 
Calculating the benefit in the apparently intuitive way, that is calculating the difference between the 
average GCs of the mode those users used before and the mode they will use after (GC1,b - GC2,a), we 
actually obtain misleading or even absurd results. In fact, this way of calculating the benefits of 
shifting users does not consider the distribution of users around the known average values.  
For example (Table 2), let us say that a group of 3 non-users of mode a before the investment has an 
average cost of 106 on mode a and 100 on mode b, thus choosing mode b. After the investment, the 
average generalised cost improves of 8 units on mode a, falling to 98. If we know (from the choice 
model) that just 2 of them change mode, we could calculate the benefit of the investment as the 




Shifting users k·Qb Before  After   
(method 1) GC1,a GC1,b GC2,a GC2,b Benefit* 
Average  106 100 98 100  
Total benefit      k·Qb·(GC1,b - GC2,a) 
= 2·2 (100-98) = 4 
*: calculated as the difference between the GC of the modes used before and after. 
Table 2. Calculation of the benefits for two users shifting from mode ‘b’ to mode ‘a’, as a consequence of the project, with the average 
GC comparison approach. 
 
However, if we could know the individual GCs of the three non-users of mode a, we would discover 
that the correct total benefit is different (higher in this case) from the one calculated as the difference 
of average GCs. The example in Table 3 shows that the average value does not correctly represent 
the individual values and cannot be used. 
 
 Before  After  Benefit* 
 GC1,a GC1,b GC2,a GC2,b  
Potential shifting user 1 102 100 94 100 6 (100-94) 
Potential shifting user 2 104 100 96 100 4 (100-96) 
Potential shifting user 3 112 100 104 100 0 (no shift) 
Total benefit     6+4+0 = 10 
*: calculated as the difference between the GC of the mode used before and after. 
Table 3. Calculation of the benefits for two users shifting from mode ‘b’ to mode ‘a’, as a consequence of the project, comparing the 
GCs of every single user 
The explanation for this inconsistency is that the average GC of the group on the mode they used 
before was not their actual GC, but just the average value of the group they used to belong (same 
origin-destination pair, same trip purpose, same hour of the day, etc. depending on the level of detail 
of the model we have). Those who shift transport mode are usually the marginal part of the group, 
that is the ones who had a cost that was already close to the mode they will shift to.  
In conclusion, we can affirm that, also when a transport model is available, the surplus calculated 
using the difference of average GCs of shifting users introduces errors. The entity of these errors 
depends on the homogeneity of the users of the groups considered. 
 
Moreover, often a transport model is not fully available to the evaluator (or does not exist at all) and 
the evaluator has to construct his own estimations of GCs based on values taken from the literature. 
In this case, evaluating the benefits using this approach is even more misleading.  
In fact, when we estimate GCs without using a calibrated transport model, we have to focus basically 
on the monetisation of time spent travelling, usually using Values of Time from the literature or 
guidelines, operating costs and the out-of-pocket expenses. If other GC components exist and we 
ignore them (for example, the interchange discomforts), the GCs obtained may result inconsistent 
with the current choices of the users and this can lead to completely paradoxical results (Grimaldi & 
Beria, 2013).2 
 
                                                 
2 This is true for any modelling exercise. However, when a transport model is available, it is usually a calibrated transport 
model, which already analysed and included all the relevant cost components, and estimated the parameters capable to 
reproduce observed figures. 
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Apart from the problems introduced in this section related to the use of the Generalised Cost 
comparison approach, there is a traffic component whose surplus change cannot be evaluated in any 
way by referring to this approach: generated traffic, that is the users who did not travel before. In this 
case, and to face correctly the problems mentioned above, most of the guidelines suggest using the 
so-called Rule of Half. 
2.2 The Rule of Half 
Traditionally the most robust and used method to calculate the variation in users’ surplus is to 
hypothesise the demand function as linear on a graph between the points representing GC with respect 
to the amount of users (Q) before and after the investment, which are known (DG Regio, 2008; 
Grimaldi e Beria, 2013; Maffii e Parolin, 2013). This hypothesis translates into the so called Rule of 
Half: the variation in existing users’ surplus is given by the area of the rectangle having base Q (the 
number of existing users) and height GC1-GC2 (the reduction in generalised costs, that is the unit 
benefit) and the new users’ surplus is given by the triangle having base Q2-Q1 (the number of new 
users) and the same height (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Representation of the Rule of Half (our elaboration). 
The variation in users’ surplus is thus given by the area of a trapezius and writeable as in Equation 2 
(hence the name “of half”). 
 
∆ܵ௨௦௘௥௦ ൌ ሺܳଵሻ ൈ ሺܩܥଵ െ ܩܥଶሻ ൅ 12 ሺܳଶ െ ܳଵሻ ൈ ሺܩܥଵ െ ܩܥଶሻ 
∆ܵ௨௦௘௥௦ ൌ 12 ሺܳଵ ൅ ܳଶሻ ൈ ሺܩܥଵ െ ܩܥଶሻ 
Equation 2
 
Such an approach is very widespread because of its simplicity and because it is the only way to 
calculate the variation in users’ surplus knowing only the amount of users and the variation in 
generalised costs (and not their absolute values, a much more difficult task),3 limitedly to the transport 
mode directly involved in the considered improvement.4 
                                                 
3 As we already mentioned before, the estimation of the absolute value of generalised costs is not a simple exercise without 
a transport model, especially in public transport and in active modes (walking and cycling). The related variation is instead 
usually made only of easily measurable items, like time savings and/or operating costs. 
4 This allows ignoring the value of the generalised cost on the mode of ‘origin’ for users shifting to the improved mode, 






This method, by treating in the same way the whole induced users (that is, both generated and shifted 
from other modes, paths, time of the day, etc.) and not needing the absolute values of the GCs, avoids 
all the problems introduced in the former section.  
Referring to the numeric example in Table 3, the Rule of Half would give a benefit for the 
improvement of mode a of 106-98 (the cost of travelling on mode a before and after) for the Q existing 
users and 1/2·(106-98) for each of the two  shifting users. The benefit for shifters calculated is now 8 
instead of 10. We still have an error, but lower, and this calculation is done without knowing the 
generalised cost of the origin mode b and, in principle, knowing just the difference between mode a 
before and after (equal to 8, without knowing that it is the result of 106-98). 
2.3 The logsum function method 
The Rule of Half refers again to average GCs, but at least assuming a certain distribution of users 
across it. Depending on the needed level of detail (and on the available data), we can minimise the 
error by disaggregating as much as possible users in homogenous groups, in terms of geography, trip 
purpose, etc. (i.e. making them more similar to the average values) and applying the Rule of Half to 
the groups separately. 
This disaggregation, theoretically always feasible, can be very demanding in practice and requiring a 
detailed transport model. Nevertheless, when a transport model is available, it is possible to use 
another method to assess the variation in users’ surplus, which overcomes some of the hypotheses 
behind the Rule of Half and gives a much more detailed representation of the benefits.  
By measuring the variation in the composite utility (logsum) of all alternatives (modes) considered 
by the transport model, it is possible to obtain a more precise calculation of the variation in users’ 
surplus (Cascetta, 1998). The higher precision derives from the fact that it takes from the calibrated 
transport model, not only the average values of the GCs, but also their implicit distribution among 
users through the coefficients of the logit formula used by the model itself. 
Most transport models, in fact, estimate the p share of users that will choose a transport mode m, on 
the origin-destination pair od, for the trip purpose s, using the following logit formula, where λs is the 




∑ ݁ఒೞ∙ீ஼೚೏|ೞ|೘௠  
Equation 3
 
The surplus of each group of user is the composite utility, that is given by the logarithm of the 
denominator of the logit formula (thus the name, “log-sum”), multiplied by the number of trips, plus 
a constant (Cascetta, 1998; de Jong et al., 2005 and 2007). The variation in the S users’ surplus is 
given by the difference between the surpluses calculated in the reference and in the intervention 
alternatives (this elides the constants) (Equation 4). 
 





The sum of these variations for all the users’ groups obviously gives the total variation of consumers’ 
surplus associated to the scheme or policy. 
                                                 
5 If the model is based on a nested logit, this operation can be done on the first (higher) level of the logit. The GC represents 
the disutility of the trip. 
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Despite well discussed in the literature quoted above, the logsum function method has been barely 
faced from an applicative point of view, when real projects and plans must be assessed. The following 
of this paper tries to go more in deep in this direction. 
3. Implications of the logsum function method  
3.1 When the logsum is recommended 
In general we can affirm that the logsum provides a better measure of surplus gains and losses, while 
the Rule of Half is, and will remain, the most used and widespread tool due to its simplicity and 
relative correctness. There are some situations, however, in which the direct use of the Rule of Half 
fails and the Logsum is recommended to correctly address the problem.6  
1. A first case is the assessment of a completely new transport option (e.g., a radically new mode; 
Maffii et al., 2012).7 Since the option does not exist in the reference alternative, we have no 
“existing” users to refer the variation of costs to and we cannot apply the Rule of Half. An 
estimation of the absolute value of the GCs is thus needed; 
2. A second case is when we want to take into account the benefits of non-dominant alternatives 
(Cascetta, 1998). Let us consider a new transport option that is not the best one for none of 
the groups of users we are considering. A transport model (by means of a logit) will allocate 
a small share of users on it anyway, but the Rule of Half would give zero (or even negative) 
benefit for it as its average GC is higher than an existing alternative. The Logsum is instead 
able to catch the true (small) benefit of this new option, considering the distribution of the 
generalised costs among group components and not only the average value. 
3. A more significant case is when the variation in the GC is too high with respect to its absolute 
value and thus the area of the triangle of induced users – with all the approximations it 
represents – becomes comparable to the one of the rectangle of existing users. This happens 
for example when we remove big bottlenecks or missing links to the mobility (e.g., by 
building a bridge among two places that were connected before only via very long detours); 
4. Finally, when we want to assess at the same time both additive and restrictive policies. In fact 
some actions give, at the same time, benefits for some users and costs for others, as it often 
happens in plans. In this case, it is impossible to know how much of the mode shift simulated 
happened because of the new costs on the origin mode or because of the benefits on the 
destination mode. The Rule of Half becomes then inapplicable in practice and introduces 
relevant double counting. 
The third and the fourth case are the most problematic and both may extensively occur in a mobility 
plan where the actions are not simply new infrastructure but involve also other demand management 
tools, such as road pricing, large car free areas, etc. 
3.2 Pitfalls and practical limits 
As already mentioned, the main limit to the widespread application of the logsum is that it is very 
data demanding and feasible only with a calibrated transport model, which is not always available.  
A second problem is that the method may lack of clarity for the unexperienced reader and does not 
allow the typical disaggregation of the outputs. Since the model calculates the composite utility for 
the users, it is not possible to specify costs and benefits of each transport mode and it is not possible 
to provide the components of the surplus variation in terms of time, costs, etc. In transport plans, 
which might entail actions that benefit some transport options and increase costs for others, this might 
                                                 
6 Actually, it is also possible to adjust the Rule of Half, obtaining a better estimation: Nellthorp and Hyman, 2001. 
7 In most cases new transport modes within the public transport sphere can be considered improvements of existing 
services (e.g., high speed rail with respect to conventional rail, or rail services with respect to bus ones). 
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represent a major readability issue. To cope with this limit, other ways to outline the distribution are 
needed. Some proposals in this direction will be given in the last section. 
Thirdly, since the calculation method is complicated, it might be difficult for an independent reader 
to fully reconstruct the calculations made, thus generating a ‘black box’ appraisal. This is a key point, 
especially when there is not a consolidated CBA framework and data to refer to. However, the 
difficulty for an independent reviewer to enter in the details of calculation of the logsum comes 
directly from the scarce permeability of transport models themselves and not of the CBA. 
4. Evaluating a mobility plan 
4.1 What makes a plan different from an infrastructural investment 
As already discussed, the assessment of a plan entails the assessment of numerous and different policy 
actions, with different spatial and time boundaries of their effects. A sample is provided in Table 4. 
 
Action/Policy Costs Benefits Investment costs are 
dominant vs. other costs? 
New infrastructure (public transport, roads capacity) PU, T pr, C, t Yes 
New/modified services on existing infrastructure PU, t pr, d, t No 
Innovative mobility (sharing, pooling, etc.)  pr, d, t No 
Bicycle lanes, bike parking, bike sharing PU, T pr, d, t Yes/No 
ITS, traffic management PU, t pr, d, t No 
Restrictive policies, car free zones, traffic calming pr, d, t d, t No 
Park and road pricing pr, d, t PU, pr, d, t No 
Public transport fares PU/pr, d, t Pr/PU, d, t No 
Symbols: “PU” public bodies, “pr” private users, “C” concentrated in space or limited to groups, “d” diffused in space or 
spread among many users, “T” punctual in time, lump sum, “t” continuous in time. 
Table 4. Policy actions in a mobility plan and type of effect 
In plans additive policies, such as new infrastructure, whose costs are public and concentrated in time, 
co-exist with restrictive policies such as traffic calming, pricing, etc., which change mobility patterns 
because rise the private costs. These two extremes must be assessed in a coherent way, but their 
effects and economic mechanisms are profoundly different. 
Moreover, the effects act synergically, so that modal shift is the effect both of the improvement of 
the destination mode (e.g. public transport) and of the worsening of the origin mode (e.g. private road 
transport).  
As said in the previous section, the Rule of Half, perfectly suitable for the assessment of new linear 
infrastructure (entailing punctual public investment to generate lower users costs on a given O-D 
pair), is not capable of catching the effect of mixed policies. In particular, it may incur in double 
counts, moreover if this occurs in different ways in different parts of a city. 
4.2 Towards a consistent integration between planning, modelling and assessment 
When a transport model is available, it is relatively easy to extract the GCs directly from the transport 
model, guaranteeing a complete consistency the model and the following cost-benefit analysis. The 
GCs derived this way can be used both with the Rule of Half and with the logsum method. 
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If the model does not provide the generalised costs of the mode alternatives, it is sufficient to extract 
the systematic utilities8 used by the model, which is usually constructed like in Equation 5. 
 
௢ܸௗ|௦|௠ ൌ 	ߚ௦|௠்௜௠௘ ∙ ܶ݅݉݁ ൅ ߚ௦|௠஼௢௦௧ ∙ ܥ݋ݏݐ ൅ ܱݐ݄݁ݎ_ܿ݋݉݌݋݊݁݊ݐݏ Equation 5
 
 
If we divide the systematic utility by the parameter related to its monetary component, we express it 
in monetary terms representing the monetary trade-off that users attribute to their trips, that is the GC 
(Equation 6). 
 
ܩܥ௢ௗ|௦|௠ ൌ ௢ܸௗ|௦|௠ߚ௦|௠஼௢௦௧  
Equation 6
 
Some transport modes might be not associated to any direct monetary component (for example 
walking and cycling). There is a way to overcome the issue, though losing some consistency (see for 
example Castiglione et al., 2003, or de Jong et al., 2007). We divide the systematic utility by the time 
parameter (which is always present) instead of by the cost one, so deriving a generalised time instead 
of the generalised cost (Equation 7). 
 
ܩ ௢ܶௗ|௦|௠ ൌ ௢ܸௗ|௦|௠ߚ௦|௠்௜௠௘
 Equation 7
 
Then we multiply this generalised time by an exogenous Value of (in-vehicle) Time (VoT), obtaining 
the generalised cost (Equation 8). 
 
ܩܥ௢ௗ|௦|௠ ൌ ܸ݋ܶ ∙ ܩ ௢ܶௗ|௦|௠ Equation 8
 
When the GCs are estimated, we can directly applying the formula of the surplus variation, discussed 
at the end of Section 2.3. It must be noticed that this passage is done at the highest level of 
disaggregation: per origin – destination pair (od), travel purpose (s) and mode (m). This is a 
computational burden, involving even millions of operations, if the study area is divided in hundreds 
of zones, like in urban areas. However, this disaggregation allows grouping the results as needed, for 
example maintaining the spatial structure of surplus variations, as shown in our case. 
 
                                                 
8 With systematic utility V we mean, according to the definition by Cascetta (1998), “the mean or the expected value of 
the utility perceived among all the users with the same choice context”. The perceived utility U is given by the sum of 
the systematic utility V and the random residual Ɛ (which represents the deviation of the single user with respect to the 
average value): U = V + Ɛ. 
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5. An example: Milan 2015-2025 urban mobility plan (SUMP) 
5.1 The CBA model 
For the assessment of new Milan’s Sustainable Urban Mobility Plan (SUMP, or PUMS in Italian) we 
interfaced the simulation model developed by the transport authority (AMAT, developed in Cube©) 
with the assessment procedures, developed in Access© and Excel©. A schematic representation of 
the algorithm developed is depicted in Figure 2. The model has been used extensively in the past 
years to plan all transport decisions in the city and can rely on solid datasets of observations, used for 
the calibration. 
 
Figure 2. The assessment procedure implemented for the Milan’s sustainable urban mobility plan (SUMP). 
The transport model provided us the generalised cost components of each origin – destination pair 
for six different travel purposes (plus the “return home” purpose) and for the four modes considered: 
car, motorbike, public transport, active modes. Each segment of the simulated mobility is associated 
to a set of calibrated beta coefficients (Equation 5), including the values of time (per trip purpose and 
per mode). To manage the fact that some transport modes does not have any monetary component, 
we transformed the generalised costs into a generalised time, as explained in section 4.2. In addition, 
the model gives the quantities, in passengers during the peak hour, for every mode on each OD pair, 
allowing us to calculate the users changing mode. Finally, the model output includes also the data 
used to correct the transfers, in particular the paid fares, the parking tolls, the road pricing tolls, the 
driven km (useful to calculate the fuel duties paid). 
Overall, the output consists of an Access file with tables of attributes (generalised time), quantities 
(amount of users) and transfers (fares, tolls and taxes) per 390,452 origin-destination pairs and 24 
(4·7) mode and travel purpose combinations. In Access, with SQL procedures, we estimated the 
surplus variation using both the logsum method (as described in the previous sections) and the Rule 
of Half method. It must be noticed that the core calculations are done at the highest disaggregation 
level, i.e. per OD pair, mode and travel purpose and, only later, we proceeded with the aggregation 
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of the results in 829 origin and destination zones, using the same zoning of the model. The same thing 
has been done for all attributes, quantities and transfers. 
Once the aggregation has been done, the datasets become more manageable with other software. The 
procedure has been then interfaced with Excel© for the CBA properly said (briefly described below) 
and with ArcGIS© to produce cartographical representations of the main variables. 
The entire process has been applied for approximately fifty final scenarios. For this reason, we spent 
particular care to partially automatize the procedure with scripts but also to track all intermediate 
results in all passages to facilitate the debug. Some controls have been introduced intermediately to 
manually check the correctness of the results. The process showed also some local inconsistencies of 
the transport model, which were corrected. 
The CBA properly said has been done in Excel, in the two variants of Economic CBA and Financial 
CBA. The elements included are listed in Figure 3 and the indicators calculated are the Net Present 
Value (NPV), the Net Benefit over Investment Ratio (NBIR) and the Benefit over Cost ratio (B/C). 
We further separate the results in two different sets of indicators, called “base” and “extended”: the 
“extended” include the health benefits for active modes, the opportunity cost of public funds and an 
approximation of the possible wider economic effects. The reason is to keep separate the consolidated 
estimations of costs and benefits, from other less reliable estimations. In general, to be conservative, 
the SUMP used the “base” indicators to decide the actions to be included. 
 
 
Figure 3. Cost Benefit Analysis components 
In addition, we developed in the same environment also the Distributive Analysis module 
(disaggregating the costs and the benefits into six users’ categories, plus the non-users, the State and 
the Local Administration) and a simple Sensitivity Analysis testing automatically the effect of users’ 
surplus estimation, investment cost and running costs on results. 
5.2 The scenarios 
Previously to the assessment phase, the planners selected a number of actions to be considered among 
the entire set of projects at stake (for example present in previous planning documents, or indicated 
by stakeholders). This pre-selection was based on a preliminary technical evaluation (for example, 
among comparable alternative solutions for a single problem, the less effective were discarded before 
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the cost benefit analysis) and on the goals set by the political actors (for example, the extension of 
cycling paths). 
The pre-selection generated 51 explorative scenarios, each one made of one single action. The nature 
of these actions is very heterogeneous, ranging from large infrastructural investments to existing lines 
extension, to the reorganisation of services. In some cases, different variants have been considered. 
The Table 5 lists the scenarios considered. 
 
Explorative scenario Number of sub scenarios 
(alternative options) 
Previous land use plan (PGT) infrastructure 3 
Metro line 1 extension 3 
Metro line 2 extension 5 
Metro line 3 extension 3 
Metro line 4 extension 4 
Metro line 5 extension 3 
New Metro line 6  3 (explorative paths) 
Tram 7 extension 4 
Tram 24, 27, 178 extensions 2 + 2 + 1 
Reorganisation of tram lines in the city centre 1 
New urban stations to support rail “circle line” services 7 
Change in a suburban rail line path 1 
Extension of bike lanes 2 
30 km/h city 1 
Road pricing (AreaC) extension 4 
Actions to increase commercial speed of surface public transport 2 
Table 5. Pre-scenarios considered 
All these explorative scenarios have been assessed using the same procedure and inputs, to keep a 
perfect comparability. The purpose of this preliminary assessment was to show which actions pass 
the CBA tests or, in case of negative results, which were the conditions to make them socio-
economically feasible. In some cases, one can argue that the action alone generates a surplus loss, but 
together with other actions, the result may change. This is the case of the 30km/h city policies: the 
effect on traffic is negative because of a reduction in road capacity, but when the policy is assessed 
together with other actions capable of shifting road users to public transport, the negative result 
improves. 
All positively assessed actions have been included in the final Plan Scenarios and evaluated together.9 
5.3 Outputs: the Appraisal Summary Table and the Book of Maps 
The CBA here shortly described is, for the first time in Italy, part of the planning process, as suggested 
in SUMP guidelines (Eltis, 2013), and does not come at the end to justify the decisions taken.10 In 
order to make the decision of the Mayor and of the City Council, but also citizens’ opinion, more 
transparent and informed, the outputs of the assessment have been presented in a homogeneous and 
                                                 
9 In this stage, no budget constraint is foreseen and all actions are included. Budget constraints can be managed 
consistently using appropriate algorithms (Bonnafous and Jensen, 2005). 
10 The process is still ongoing at the moment of writing and no final decisions have been taken yet. 
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detailed way. Documents and analysed clarify all the relevant facts which should back the decisions, 
not limitedly to the sole aggregate CBA indicators (NPV, NBIR, B/C). 
To do that, the results of both the explorative scenarios and the final scenarios are presented through 
the following outputs. 
i. The Appraisal Summary Table (“Tabella di valutazione sintetica”), directly inspired by the 
ones used in the UK (DfT, 2014); 
ii. the Book of Maps (“Quaderno delle mappe”) representing spatially the main effects of the 
actions. 
The Appraisal Summary Table is organised in four parts (Figure 4): the socio-economic assessment 
(including the sensitivity analysis), the financial assessment, the distributive analysis and a summary 
of results, which includes a general comment.  
The socio-economic assessment box includes a summary of the aspects considered in the appraisal. 
In the majority of cases, we provided both a description of the effect, a quantification (for example 
the reduction of km driven) and the translation in monetary terms. The sum of all monetised impacts 
gives the Net Present Value (NPV). As already said, we provided two versions of the NPV, one 
including the effects with a reliable quantification and another which adds up also some extra effects. 
In addition to NPV, the Net Benefit over Investment Ratio (NBIR) and the Benefit Cost Ratio 
indicators have been computed, too. 
The assessed policies include also soft mobility policies, entailing effects of difficult monetisation, 
such as the quality of urban environment, etc. We decided not to stress the quantification of these 
aspects and kept them explicitly separate from the “core” of direct impacts, providing just a simple 
qualitative judgement. In the majority of cases, typically new infrastructure, these non-quantified 
effects are likely not such to change the overall results. To the contrary, in some cases these are the 
most relevant aspects and the CBA results incomplete, providing just a quantification of the transport 
impacts. The decision on these policies will then just take into account the quantified effects and the 
trade off with the non-quantified ones is left to the decision maker; however, as the main direct 
transport effects are clarified, the decision results more transparent than without any quantification. 
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Figure 4. An example of Appraisal Summary Table organisation 
In addition to the AST, and to enrich the distributive analysis, a Book of Maps has been produced. 
Based on the detailed zoning of the city, it represents spatially numerous indicators included in the 
analysis, aggregated by origin or by destination zone (surplus gains and losses per zone, modal shift, 
travel time and distance variations). In particular, it precisely depicts the distribution of the 
Consumers’ Surplus, showing which zones benefit from the investment and which zones present a 
welfare loss.  
The majority of actions, like new infrastructure, give extra benefits to the users of the zones directly 
involved and is nearly irrelevant for those not involved (see for example Figure 5, left side). The 
spatial extension of the benefits depends on the nature of the action: for example, new metro lines 
spread their benefits on larger parts of the study area, while short tram extensions give only local 
benefits. However, some actions may give different impacts, such as a benefit for part of the city and 
costs to other zones, as exemplified in Figure 5, right side. These cases must be addressed carefully 
by the policy maker. Typically, if the action overall is socio-economically efficient, it might be 
necessary to implement other actions to offset the costs generated to part of the users. In the case of 
Milan’s SUMP, the final scenarios, including all actions chosen, present positive impact on the entire 
urban area, but this has been made possible by the analysis of single action scenarios. 
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Figure 5. Examples of consumers' surplus variation maps 
5.4 General findings 
It is out of this paper’s goals to present the results of the plan assessment. However, some policy and 
methodological indications of general interest can be derived from the work done.  
A first relevant fact is related to the decreasing B/C ratio with the dimension of the investment (Figure 
6). The single-action scenarios analysed, despite not randomly chosen and despite different in nature, 
show quite clearly that the bigger is the investment, the smaller is the B/C ratio. This is true also 
limiting to infrastructural investments and extensions. A similar result has been found elsewhere in 
the literature (Eddington, 2006), but overall not sufficiently studied.  
 
 
Figure 6. B/C ratio over investment for the 51 preliminary scenarios. 
An interpretation is that, in a mature network like Milan’s one, large additive investments result 
marginal with respect to smaller, but effective, bottleneck removal or missing links completion. 
Policies are even more efficient: involve very limited investments (or no investment at all) but, if 
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correctly designed, give large benefits. It is, for example, the case of road pricing extension, whose 
overall congestion benefits offset the drivers’ welfare losses associated to the tolls. 
 
A second relevant methodological result, to be further analysed in detail, deals with the difference 
between the surplus estimation calculated with the Rule of Half and with the Logsum method. As we 
have discussed before, the Logsum method is the only reliable method in case of non-additive policies 
(like pricing, capacity reductions, etc.), while the Rule of Half can be appropriately used if the scheme 
is the typical investment entailing an initial investment cost and successive users’ benefits. 
Thanks to the sample of 50 schemes analysed, we can test the difference between the two estimations. 
In particular, we calculate the ratio between the consumers’ surplus obtained with the Rule of Half 
and the one obtained with the Logsum method: the nearest to one is this figure, the more similar are 
the two estimations. Figure 7 draw these ratios, distinguishing between additive actions, i.e. the 
actions (or groups of actions) that always generate net benefits to some users, and the other actions, 




Figure 7. Distribution of RoH/logsum ratios 
Results for the two groups are clearly different. The second group presents totally inconsistent ratios: 
assuming that the logsum method is correct – also because gives the expected signs – the Rule of Half 
method is totally misleading, generally calculating much more benefits than logsum. This suggests 
that double counts exist. For example, the final scenario plans present a net benefit for the users, as 
expected, if calculated with the logsum, but surprisingly a worsening in surplus if calculated with the 
RoH. 
More interesting is the case of the additive actions, in which we classified all infrastructural 
investments and all modifications to existing services. In this case, the distribution is more revealing 
and the majority of measures is between 0.7 and 0.9 (with an average of 0.87): this evokes that the 
Rule of Half method underestimates the consumers’ surplus, of 10% to 30%. Of course, this figure 
comes from our limited sample and is not generalizable as it is, but shows an interesting concentration. 
In general, this means that the logsum method is catching also some otherwise “hidden” benefits, i.e. 
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the benefits for the marginal users, ignored by the more deterministic Rule of Half. The cases at the 
extreme of our ranges may represent cases of limited double counts, or border effects, or general 
localised errors of the model. 
6. Conclusions 
Cost benefit analysis and public expenditure assessment techniques are broadly studied in literature. 
However, some relevant aspects of evaluation, especially related to the practical application in 
complex cases and to the effective inclusion of CBA in the policy design process, remain unsolved.  
The primary objective of this paper is to give indications about how to correctly evaluate, using cost-
benefit analysis, entire urban mobility plans. This need is more and more actual, given the increasing 
shift of mobility planning practices (Eltis, 2013) from single infrastructure, to complex and consistent 
urban plans. In fact, compared to simple infrastructure investments, plans entail the implementations 
of heterogenic actions, which might provide simultaneously benefit for some and costs for others. 
This can undermine the assumptions of the common methods to assess consumers’ surplus: the direct 
Generalised Costs comparison, in general never recommended as we commented in detail, or even 
the usually more solid Rule of Half.  
Since transport plans are – and should be, due to their complexity – supported by transport model 
analysis, we suggest here how to extract the needed data from the choice model and to adopt the 
logsum method for consumers’ surplus calculation, which overcomes most of the limits of other 
methods. Thanks to the application of this method to the numerous scenarios of the new Milan’s 
Sustainable Urban Mobility Plan, and comparing it with the Rule of Half, we find confirmation that 
the two methods give similar results when evaluating single infrastructure (the average ratio between 
the benefits calculated with the Rule of Half and the logusum is 0.87), but completely diverge when 
evaluating other policies or the plan overall. 
A second outcome of the paper deals with the enrichment of the outputs of evaluation, again thanks 
to the integration with a transport model. The application developed for Milan include two possible 
ways to effectively represent and communicate the outputs of the evaluation: an Appraisal Summary 
Table (inspired by the British one) and a geographical and social Distibutive Analysis, depicting 
spatially the effects of the policies. These tools can help making the results more clear to politicians, 
policy makers, stakeholders and citizens, and in general improve the transparency and the awareness 
of the choices taken. 
Finally, the results of the assessment of the actions considered in Milan’s plan evidence decreasing 
socio-economic return on investment with the dimension of the project, as already found elsewhere. 
This fact has profound consequences on planning, suggesting that, on average, in mature networks 
smaller actions give systematically higher efficiency than large and expensive projects. 
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